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How Hackers of Submarine Cables May Be Held Liable 




Submarine internet cables play a vital role in the modern economy and transmit almost all 
global internet connections between countries. These cables, however, are vulnerable to interference 
or hacking by foreign states who seek to obtain the valuable data that passes through them. 
Because these cables are located on the high seas, however, no country has legal jurisdiction over 
large portions of them allowing for any number of states or private actors to hack into them and 
steal valuable information. This Comment evaluates whether states have any legal recourse under 
public international law against entities that hack into submarine cables. To answer this 
question, this Comment explores the development of public international law with respect to the 
high seas and evaluates public international norms for hacking and cyber operations. This 
Comment then argues, given the weakness of current domestic regimes with respect to submarine 
cable protections, the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea can assert jurisdiction over 
disputes related to submarine hacking. This Comment further makes the novel argument that 
states can assert damage done to cables through hacking or violations of citizens’ rights to privacy 
through hacking present potential legal avenues to pursue liability against submarine hacking.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Contrary to popular belief, the global internet is largely comprised of a 
network of data cables linking states and continents and not satellite links 
propelling data through the air.1 In communications between continents, 
approximately 99% of all telecommunications is transmitted via a network of 
around 400 underwater, submarine cables. 2 For example, to send an email from 
Boston to Dublin, the GTT Atlantic Cable would route your message under the 
Atlantic Ocean through Nova Scotia, Northern Ireland, and London before 
arriving in Dublin. 3 This process would take place nearly instantaneously but 
traverse hundreds of miles of fiber optic cable under the Atlantic Ocean. 
These undersea cables are only about the size of a garden hose but represent 
billions of dollars of productivity and information. If a ship were to drop anchor 
in the wrong location and sever a cable, internet service could be cut to an entire 
country.4 If a rogue agent elected to cut the cables to the United States, an 
estimated $10 trillion in daily financial transfers and vast amounts of data would 
be clogged up.5 Because damage to submarine cables is so devastating, the 
international community has devised a number of conventions and domestic 
protections to protect against cable damage. 
More insidiously, however, these cables are also at risk of hacking and 
intelligence gathering because so much data flows through them. States can use 
submarines to make small slits in submarine cables and insert listening and data 
collection devices.6 These spying states then collect all the information that flows 
through the cables: every overseas telephone call, email, financial transfer, or data 
upload that passes through the internet from one country to another is collected.7 
Encryption of information that passes through these cables somewhat protects 
against intelligence gathering, but sophisticated operators can often break 
encryption and can nevertheless obtain useful information through the metadata 
 
1  See, generally Edward Malecki & Hu Wei, A Wired World: The Evolving Geography of Submarine Cables 
and the Shift to Asia, 99 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 360 (2009). 
2  Greg Miller, Undersea Internet Cables are Surprisingly Vulnerable, WIRED (Oct. 29, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/X53J-XMHA. 
3  Submarine Cable Map, TELEGEOGRAPHY, https://perma.cc/S2SR-FL66 (2021). 
4  Chris Baynes, Entire Country Taken Offline for Two Days After Undersea Internet Cable Cut, INDEP. (Apr 
11, 2018), https://perma.cc/26LE-P6QD. 
5  Tim Johnson McClatchy, Undersea Cables: Too Valuable to Leave Vulnerable, GOV’T TECH. (Dec. 12, 
2017), https://perma.cc/AH3X-TPMX.  
6  Christopher Drew, Divers Say Net Tied Submarine to Listening Device, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2005), 
https://perma.cc/YXS8-ACXT. 
7  Sophia Ankel, Russian Intelligence Agents Reportedly Went to Ireland to Inspect Undersea Cables, and It’s 
Reigniting Fears They Could Cut Them and Take Entire Countries Offline, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 17, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/8CE7-V38L. 
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embedded in encrypted transmissions.8 This massive amount of information 
provides valuable military, economic, and personal information to the hacking 
country. This hacking, however, is also a violation of citizens’ privacy and a 
violation of the hacked states’ economic and military interests. 
Out of concern for this sort of hacking, in 2020 the U.S. blocked Google 
and Facebook from turning on a submarine cable linking the U.S. and Hong 
Kong.9 Although the 8,000 mile cable had already been laid and hundreds of 
millions of dollars were spent on its development, the U.S. was too concerned 
about potential Chinese intelligence pilfering to let the cable go live.10  The 
decision dramatically demonstrates the U.S.’s fears around submarine cable 
hacking have grown to exceptional new heights. And the U.S. government’s fears 
are not misplaced. In 2013, the British spy agency the Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) was found to secretly have tapped into 
undersea cables to gather information.11 In 2015, U.S. sensors detected Russian 
submarines near undersea cables raising concerns.12 And during the Cold War, the 
U.S. tapped into Soviet undersea cables and gathered critical intelligence as part 
of Operation Ivy Bells.13 
As the world becomes increasingly interconnected and states increasingly 
rely on the internet economically, hacking into internet infrastructure becomes a 
greater threat. The U.S., for example, has undertaken expensive and extensive 
efforts to remove Huawei from its domestic telecommunication infrastructure to 
prevent the Chinese government from spying domestically.14 Undersea cables, 
however, are not so easily protected. Undersea cables are expensive to lay,15 
 
8  DOUG BRAKE, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., SUBMARINE CABLES: CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS (2019), https://perma.cc/8YQ8-T9TL. 
9  Anthony Spadafora, Google, Facebook Undersea Web Cable Will No Longer Connect US and Hong Kong, 
TECHRADAR (Aug. 31, 2020), https://perma.cc/U8YZ-FXXS. 
10  Justin Sherman, The US-China Battle over the Internet Goes Under the Sea, WIRED (June 24, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/5X8K-8FY4. 
11  Ewen MacAskill, Julian Borger, Nick Hopkins, Nick Davis & James Ball, GCHQ Taps Fibre-optic 
Cables for Secret Access to the World’s Telecommunciations, THE GUARDIAN (June 21, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/4DGD-HRN5.  
12  Barbara Starr, U.S. Sensors Detect Russian Submarines Near Underwater Cables, CNN (Oct. 28, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/RL96-QV9L.  
13  Olga Khazan, The Creepy, Long-Standing Practice of Undersea Cable Tapping, THE ATLANTIC (July 16, 
2013), https://perma.cc/W8GY-F5R2. 
14  David McCabe, F.C.C. Designates Huawei and ZTE as National Security Threats, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 
2020), https://perma.cc/PW37-6Z2Y. 
15  Tim Hornyak, Here’s What It Takes to Lay Google’s 9,000km Undersea Cable, COMPUTERWORLD (July 
13, 2015), https://perma.cc/EHL6-GSMX (approximately $300 million for a cable between the 
U.S. and Japan). 
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difficult to replace, and often traverse international waters over which states do 
not have exclusive domain.16 
Even with such a large threat, there is an open question as to whether states 
can protect against submarine cable hacking. The fundamental question this 
Comment seeks to answer is whether states have any recourse or protections 
against submarine cable hacking by foreign states under public international law. 
This Comment argues the increasingly recognized international right to privacy 
can provide grounds for protecting against submarine cable hacking and that 
states can enforce this right through dispute resolution mechanisms for the high 
seas. 
This Comment proceeds in five sections to develop this answer. Section II 
provides a brief overview of the technology behind submarine cables and the 
methods used in hacking these cables. Section III evaluates current attitudes in 
the international community with respect to submarine cable hacking and explains 
why norms around privacy, combined with the incredible resources required to 
protect cables from hacking, may lead to a shift in states’ treatment of submarine 
cable hacking. 
Section IV explores the history of international treaties and conventions 
surrounding submarine cables and the high seas. Section V summarizes current 
public international law related to cyber operations and hacking and discusses the 
emergence of a newly recognized international right to privacy with respect to 
telecommunications and personal data. Section VI discusses current scholarly 
responses to submarine cable hacking to situate this Comment’s solution in 
present scholarship. And in Section VII, I propose a novel solution addressing the 
problem of submarine cable hacking using the international right to privacy 
adjudicated through dispute resolution mechanisms developed for the high seas. 
The use of the international right to privacy and this dispute resolution body is 
presently underdiscussed by scholars. This solution further advances the right to 
privacy as integral to protect against submarine cable hacking and describes how 
shifts in attitudes toward privacy may contribute to the creation of norms against 
surveillance hacking. 
II.  TECHNICAL PRIMER ON HACKING AND SUBMARINE 
CABLES  
This Section describes the network of submarine cables that makes up the 
modern internet, the technical elements of modern submarine cable hacking 
techniques, and the possibility of damage by submarine cable hacking. This 
information is relevant to subsequent possible solutions around submarine cable 
 
16  James Griffiths, The Global Internet Is Powered by Vast Undersea Cables. But They’re Vulnerable, CNN 
(July 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/3VJM-LQQD.  
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hacking because international treaties require some protections against incidental 
or intentional damage to submarine cables, as discussed in Section IV. 
Most of the internet is formed through a network of undersea submarine 
cables.17 About the size of a garden hose, these cables are buried just under the 
ocean floor by submarine-cable laying ships and transmit internet data between 
countries.18 While there are some legacy cables that transmit primarily telephone 
or telegraph information, the majority of modern cables are fiber optic cables that 
can transmit dozens of Terabytes of data per second.19 While some cables are 
specially created for military and intelligence transmission purposes, the majority 
of cables are general in use and transmit commercial, government, and private 
commercial correspondence simultaneously.20 
Because laying and operating a cable across large bodies of water is so costly, 
most cables were historically financed, laid, and operated by a consortium of 
multiple owners. For example, the U.S., Japan, and Australia agreed in 2020 to 
jointly finance a cable link to the Pacific island nation of Palau at a cost of $30 
billion.21  Despite this history, individual companies or governments increasingly 
financed and laid submarine cables.22 For example, in 2020 Google announced it 
was financing and constructing its own cable linking the U.S., the United 
Kingdom, and Spain.23 
Once laid, cables are maintained and operated by the financing consortium 
or the private company financing the cable project. These cable operators are 
responsible for maintenance and repairs for any damage to the cable. Due to their 
length, most modern cables are outfitted with fault monitoring systems that can 
detect cable breaks or points of damage for repair.24 
States are capable of spying on submarine cables. As discussed below, 
because the hacking of cables requires specialized equipment including 
submarines, most experts are concerned with government-sponsored hacking 
 
17 Id. 
18  Stewart Ash, The Development of Submarine Cables, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW 
AND POLICY 19 (Douglas R. Burnett, Robert C. Beckman & Tara C. Davenport eds., 2014). 
19  Klint Finley, How Google Is Cramming More Data into Its New Atlantic Cable, WIRED (Apr. 5, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/D49P-23GW.  
20  H.I. Sutton, How Russian Spy Submarines Can Interfere with Undersea Internet Cables, FORBES (Aug. 19, 
2020), https://perma.cc/5BXR-4CWT.  
21  Yohei Hirose, Japan, US and Australia to Finance Undersea Cable for Palau, NIKKEI ASIA (Oct. 28, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/2WXP-FH9D. 
22  Marissa Alcala et al., Financing Subsea Cables in Latin America, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (June 16, 
2020), https://perma.cc/QPG9-QKZW. 
23  Sam Shead, Google Is Building a Huge Undersea Fiber-Optic Cable to Connect the U.S. to Britain and Spain, 
CNBC (July 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/T3GE-N363. 
24  See generally ISAAC GEISLER ET AL., DEP’T OF SYS. ENG’G & OPERATIONS RES., GEO. MASON UNIV., 
DESIGN OF A TRANSOCEANIC CABLE SYSTEM (2015), https://perma.cc/7WPB-HRPE. 
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attempts.25 Third-party and private actors, however, are still considered a risk to 
submarine cables. When four cables linking Europe and the Middle East were 
simultaneously damaged, many officials and commercial operators alleged private 
actors had cut the cables.26 Although more sophisticated technology is required to 
hack a cable compared to destroying one, the threat of terrorists hacking a 
submarine cable remains even if not manifest to date.27 
In general, the process by which intelligence agencies tap into cables is highly 
secretive. There are some indications, however, as to how it is done. Some reports 
indicate states use specially designed submarines equipped with devices to splice 
into cables. In this “splicing method,” the submarine, having broken through the 
protective coating, installs listening devices within the fiber optic cable to collect 
transmitted data.28 Some commentators, however, cast doubt on this method due 
to the possibility of a cable operator detecting a break in data transmission through 
the cable.29 Some reports nevertheless indicate the techniques are sophisticated 
enough to not alert cable operators even when external damage to the cable is 
already done.30 The possibility of damage to the cable or service interruption 
through splicing is important in the global regulatory regime for cable protections, 
as will be discussed at length in Section VI. 
Other hacking methods appear less obtrusive. Some intelligence analysts 
have speculated operators gain access to a cable at landing stations—stations fitted 
with signal boosting equipment and cable access features—in order to install 
intercept probes that capture the fiber optic light signal and make a copy of it.31 
This method, and a similar one involving creating a slight curvature within the 
cable to siphon off data as it passes through the curve, may not alert an operator 
that hacking has occurred because the cable does not witness a service interruption 
 
25  Griffiths, supra note 16. 
26  Investigators ultimately determined a ship’s anchor was to blame for at least one of four 
simultaneously damaged cables connecting the Middle East and Europe, but many at the time 
alleged the cables were damaged by private actors and conspiracy theories still abound. Lily Hay 
Newman, Cut Undersea Cable Plunges Yemen Into Days-Long Internet Outage, WIRED (Jan. 13, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/C4AF-CLBG; Kim Zetter, Undersea Cables Cut; 14 Countries Lose Web – Updated, 
WIRED (Dec. 19, 2008), https://perma.cc/3TGK-EUHH. 
27  MICHAEL SECHRIST, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. BELFER CTR., NEW THREATS, OLD TECHNOLOGY: 
VULNERABILITIES IN UNDERSEA COMMUNICATIONS CABLE NETWORK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
(2012), https://perma.cc/953R-MSKW. 
28  New Nuclear Sub Is Said to Have Special Eavesdropping Ability, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2005), 
https://perma.cc/KDM9-683P. 
29  See Tara M. Davenport, Submarine Cables, Cybersecurity & International Law: An Intersectional Analysis, 
24 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 57, 103–5 (2015). 
30  Meghan Neal, How to Hack the Backbone of the Internet, VICE (Oct. 31, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/6MWG-CF3E.  
31  See Khazan, supra note 13. 
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seen in splicing.32 While these methods involve some damage to the cable, they 
may not be easily identified or protected against even by wary states. Generally, 
while the method used may differ, most methods involve some degree of damage 
to the submarine cable and some degree of interference with a cable’s data 
transmission. 
III.  THE SHIFTING DIALOGUE AROUND SUBMARINE CABLE 
HACKING  
This Section discusses why submarine cable hacking is a pressing and ripe 
area for solutions within public international law. As noted above, most of the 
world’s global powers, particularly the U.S., China, and Russia, enjoy the ability to 
hack into one another’s cables and may want to reserve that ability. This may 
indicate few states would be interested in developing norms or international public 
law against submarine cable hacking. Indeed, the lack of a global convention 
against peacetime hacking may signal a lack of state interest in curbing this 
behavior. The ground, however, may be shifting. 
First, the volume of information, and in turn sensitive information, that 
passes through submarine cables is growing. Presently, submarine cables carry 
95% of all international communications.33 As countries continue to develop and 
as crises like COVID-19 require more work and entertainment to be done 
remotely, global demand for internet bandwidth rises.34 In turn, submarine cable 
use will only increase. Global consumer IP traffic is expected to rise from 212 
Exabytes per month in 2020 to 333 Exabytes per month in 2022.35 Submarine 
cable bandwidth and traffic are expected to rise by 40% by 2022.36 In 2020 alone, 
global submarine cable bandwidth rose by 35%.37 Correspondingly, the submarine 
cable market is expected to grow at approximately 11% by year from 2020 to 2025 
increasing the market’s total value from $10.3 billion to $22 billion.38 The need for 
cable protection then increases as the value and flow of data increases through 
submarine cables. 
 
32  Id. 
33  Submarine Cables, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (NOAA), https://perma.cc/2YKK-
DTS3. 
34  Paul Brodsky, Let’s Just Say Demand Is Thriving in the Global Bandwidth Market, TELEGEOGRAPHY DIG. 
(May 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/B245-M8FE.  
35  Data Volume of Global Consumer IP Traffic From 2017 to 2022, STATISTA (Feb. 2019), 
https://perma.cc/FY6S-NVT6. 
36  Alex Vaxmonsky, New Subsea Cable Architectures Are Carrying the World’s Traffic, EQUINIX (Mar. 16, 
2020), https://perma.cc/9GHL-WD9A.  
37  Geoff Bennett, Subsea Cable Capacity: Where Do We Go Next?, SUBMARINE TELECOMS F. (Sept. 21, 
2020), https://perma.cc/8P7K-NKJ3. 
38  Submarine Cable System Market Worth $22.0 Billion by 2025, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 27, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/7QTT-LM33.   
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Second, while covert and secretive, state hacking and cyber operations only 
appear to be increasing in scope and frequency. In 2013, leaks revealed the British 
intelligence service the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) 
was tapping dozens of fiber optic cables processing over 600 million telephone 
events and 21 Petabytes of data each day.39 In 2015, American and NATO security 
forces became concerned with Russian submarines and spy ships increasingly 
patrolling areas near American submarine cables.40 And the threat of Russian 
activity has only increased. Russia has built out its submarine fleet,41 and a number 
of these submarines are claimed to be equipped with cable hacking capabilities.42 
This buildout of state capabilities to hack submarine cables has shifted states’ 
behavior with respect to submarine cables and hacking generally. Out of concern 
of Chinese hacking attempts, as mentioned above, U.S. regulators prevented the 
Pacific Light Cable Network connecting the U.S. and Hong Kong from going 
live.43 This was seen as a dramatic move because Google and Facebook had 
already spent over $300 million to construct the cable.44 In the commercial 
context, the U.S. and China agreed in 2015 to halt government support for cyber 
theft of corporate secrets or business information.45 In crafting the treaty, the U.S. 
asserted the two countries would together seek “international rules of the road for 
appropriate conduct in cyberspace” out of a growing concern around an arms race 
in cyber operations and hacking.46 While not the same as submarine cable hacking, 
the commercial hacking détente between China and the U.S. indicates some shift 
in behavior around state-sponsored hacking. The international community may 
be heading toward a similar watershed moment for crafting treaties around 
submarine cable hacking given the buildout of state hacking capabilities. 
Third, citizens and states are increasingly aware of hacking and intelligence 
gathering conducted through submarine cables. Expressions of outrage against 
these methods have increased accordingly. After Edward Snowden revealed the 
extent of spying on U.S. citizens, thousands took to the streets to protest against 
 
39  MacAskill et al., supra note 11. 
40  David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Russian Ships Near Data Cables Are Too Close for U.S. Comfort, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 25, 2015), https://perma.cc/WM9H-G9C6.  
41  Xavier Vavasseur, Russia’s Pacific Fleet to Get 15 New Vessels in 2020, NAVAL NEWS (May 29, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/39VS-4HZD.  
42  Garrett Hinck, Evaluating the Russian Threat to Undersea Cables, LAWFARE (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/5RRD-PSX2.  
43  Agence-France Presse, Pacific Data Cable Not Safe from China if Hong Kong Included, Says US, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/HWY2-BLAB.  
44  Mark Harris, Google and Facebook Turn Their Backs on Undersea Cable to China, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 6, 
2020), https://perma.cc/D3YQ-55H8.  
45  David E. Sanger & Steven Lee Myers, After a Hiatus, China Accelerates Cyberspying Efforts to Obtain 
U.S. Technology, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/KB46-K7SG.  
46  Id. 
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government surveillance.47 Human rights watch groups and the media continue to 
monitor and critique civilian surveillance and spying efforts, and those criticisms 
have only increased in recent years. The U.N. Human Rights Office of the High 
Commissioner has produced annual reports related to the right to privacy in the 
digital age and has advocated for greater recognition of the right to privacy against 
broad surveillance.48 As citizens, NGOs, and political bodies increasingly advocate 
for protections for the right to privacy, states will increasingly shift their behavior 
to cooperating around greater privacy protections out of fear of losing the favor 
of the electorate. 
Fourth, cables are not capable of being monitored like other military or 
commercial assets. Due to their length stretching hundreds of miles in the open 
ocean and the number of cables traversing the sea, states would need to expend 
unconscionable resources to patrol for surface ships and submarines that threaten 
cables. While cable operators are able to observe real-time widespread disruptions 
in data service, sophisticated hacking agents are supposedly able to splice into 
submarine cables without alerting cable operators.49 To intercept cable hacking 
operators, a state would then need a nearby ship, or perhaps even submarine, 
capable of detecting and intercepting a hacking submarine. Indeed, it is difficult 
to fathom the resources required to patrol the 5,000 or so miles from Los Angeles 
to Tokyo across the Pacific for one cable let alone dozens of cables. Accordingly, 
spying attempts on cables are likely to succeed. NATO and British intelligence 
officers have acknowledged fears of Russian cable hacking in the Atlantic have 
grown because states cannot constantly patrol for hacking attempts.50 
Because states are unable to fully patrol against submarine hacking attempts, 
states may want additional tools in their foreign policy toolbox to address possible 
hacking attempts. As the danger posed by hacking grows and because the 
resources required to patrol against hacking are so immense, states will need to 
explore alternative means to protect cables and their sensitive data, which may 
include recognizing liability for hacking. By recognizing grounds for liability 
against submarine cable hacking, states can obtain a tool for enforcement against 
rogue actors when the costs and benefits are in their favor. 
 
47  Jim Newell, Thousands Gather in Washington for Anti-NSA ‘Stop Watching Us’ Rally, THE GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 26, 2013), https://perma.cc/VWF5-AFSN.  
48  The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMM’R, https://perma.cc/PH43-
KGJY.  
49  For attempts to solve this problem and a description of the technical requirements involved, see 
Lijuan Zhao et al., On-Line Monitoring System of 110 kV Submarine Cable Based on BOTDR, 216 
SENSORS & ACTUATORS 28 (2014); Ye Yincan et al., Submarine Cable Project Management and 
Maintenance Monitoring Information System, in SUBMARINE OPTICAL CABLE ENGINEERING 259 (Ye 
Yincan, Jiang Xinmin, Pan Guofu, Jiang Wei eds., 2018). 
50  Could Russia Cut Undersea Communication Cables?, BBC (Dec. 15, 2017), https://perma.cc/XX95-
7X7M. 
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Fifth, while the U.S., China, and Russia, among others, may want to continue 
participating in hacking operations, not all states participate in hacking and not all 
states will want to continue to allow hacking to persist on the global stage. 
Landlocked states and states with less robust submarine military presences do not 
have the same incentives to allow submarine hacking to continue because they 
cannot as easily participate. Further, these states may be incidentally damaged by 
hacking attempts against U.S. or Russian submarine cables because their 
information flows through those same cables to other states.51 These states may 
then want protections against submarine hacking regardless of whether global 
powers, like the U.S. and China, want the practice to continue. 
The geopolitical landscape and incentives around protections against cable 
hacking thus appear to be shifting. Accordingly, this Comment turns to 
international public law as a potential way to curb hacking behavior. In the 
following Section, this Comment examines the protections currently afforded to 
cables under public international law. Subsequently, this Comment evaluates 
current scholarly thought on solutions within the public international legal system 
before proposing a novel solution to the problem of submarine cable hacking. 
IV.  INTERNATIONAL LAWS REGULATING SUBMARINE CABLES  
This Section offers an overview of the history of submarine cable 
protections and an overview of current submarine cable protections in public 
international law. The history of submarine cable protection offers strong insight 
into how current protections were developed. By understanding how cable 
protections changed over time, this Comment helps better understand the norms 
around cables outside of the language of international conventions. Further, the 
history of submarine cables can inform our understanding of the protections 
dispute resolution bodies are willing to extend to cables when evaluating 
international law. 
A.  The 1884 Convention for the Protection of Submarine 
Telegraph Cables  
International protections for submarine cables began, surprisingly enough, 
in the 1880s with the dawn of undersea telegraph wires. Due to threats from 
fishermen and pirates who accidentally or intentionally severed telegraph cables,52 
27 states joined together to create the 1884 Convention for the Protection of 
 
51  Adam Satariano, How the Internet Travels Across Oceans¸ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/KVR3-WD5N.  
52  For example, the first submarine cable crossing the English Channel was cut by a fisherman who 
thought he discovered a new species of seaweed. Eric Wagner, Submarine Cables and Protections 
Provided by the Law of the Sea, 19 MARINE POLICY 127, 128 (1995). 
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Submarine Telegraph Cables.53 Principally, the 1884 Convention was designed to 
protect cables against willful or negligent damage to cables that may interrupt or 
obstruct telegraph signals.54 
The 1884 Convention, however, was limited in scope and application. Rather 
than develop a comprehensive international court to handle submarine cable 
disputes or violations of the convention, the 1884 Convention required states to 
create their own national regulations to protect submarine cables.55 Many 
signatory states, such as Canada, never implemented national laws in accordance 
with the Convention. Other participating states, like China, never signed the 
Convention and similarly have not developed comprehensive domestic laws in 
accordance with the Convention’s requirements.56 Where states did implement 
domestic laws under their Convention obligations, those protections were 
generally piecemeal and weak. For example, the U.S. enacted the 1888 Submarine 
Cable Act57 in response to the 1884 Convention, but fines under the statute are so 
small the U.S. Coast Guard does not pursue violators. There is not a single record 
of a criminal charge under the statute and civil fines are capped at $5,000.58 
The signing countries in 1884 could not have anticipated the emergence of 
internet submarine cables or hacking into these cables to pilfer vital information. 
The 1884 Convention, however, may offer some recourse for this sort of 
misbehavior. Article II provides it is a punishable offense to “break or injure a 
submarine cable, willfully or by culpable negligence, in such manner as might 
interrupt or obstruct telegraphic communication.”59 Splicing or tapping into 
submarine cables requires some damage to the cable and some degree of service 
interruption to intercept transmitted data. Article II may then apply to submarine 
cable hacking. 
Nevertheless, the 1884 Convention may be limited in its protective ability. 
First, the Convention requires states to implement domestic regimes protecting 
cables. Because domestic jurisdiction over foreign nationals is limited, especially 
on the high seas as will be discussed, these protections are limited in reach. 
 
53  Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, Mar. 14, 1884 [hereinafter 1884 
Convention]. 
54  Id. art. II (“It is a punishable offence to break or injure a submarine cable, willfully or by culpable 
negligence, in such manner as might interrupt or obstruct telegraphic communication, either wholly 
or partially, such punishment being without prejudice to any civil action for damages.”). 
55  Id. art. XII (“The High Contracting Parties engage to take or to propose to their respective 
legislatures the necessary measures for insuring the execution of the present Convention, and 
especially for punishing, by either fine or imprisonment, or both, those who contravene the 
provisions of Articles II, V and VI.”). 
56  Id. art. 17. 
57  47 USC § 21 et seq. 
58  Wagner, supra note 52, at 135. 
59  1884 Convention, supra note 53, art. II. 
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Further, because Article II is limited solely to “telegraphic wires,” it is not clear 
whether damage to submarine internet cables portends liability under the 
Convention. While many modern cables have the ability to transmit telegraphs, 
most are fiber optic cables and therefore may be outside the convention’s scope. 
And unlike subsequent conventions, the 1884 Convention did not create a tribunal 
or dispute resolution body to handle these issues. States then are reliant on other 
states’ domestic regulations for protecting submarine cables. Regardless of its 
limited applicability to hacking, however, the 1884 Convention pioneered 
protections for submarine cables, the spirt of which have since been largely 
incorporated in modern treaties dealing with the high seas. 
B.  Intermediary Treaties and the U.N. Convention on the Law 
of the Sea 
Following the 1884 Convention, the international community incorporated 
further protections for submarine cables in broader treaties related to the high 
seas. In 1958, the Geneva Conventions on the Continental Shelf and the 1958 
Convention on the High Seas incorporated portions of the 1884 Convention. 
Namely, protections of cables from willful or culpably negligent damage and 
indemnification obligations for other cable owners were incorporated in these 
later conventions from the 1884 Convention.60 
Notably, the 1958 High Seas Convention additionally codified the freedom 
to lay cables as a high seas freedom, expanding the protections offered by the 1884 
Convention.61 Specifically, Article II holds “the high seas being open to all nations, 
no State may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty”  and 
the “freedom to lay submarine cables” is one such recognized right.62 Article 
XXVI further affirms “States shall be entitled to lay submarine cables and 
pipelines on the bed of the high seas.”63 This Convention also introduced more 
limited rights on the continental shelf and territorial waters, a distinction to be 
discussed at length.64 This Convention was the first to establish a general freedom 
to lay submarine cables which has become central to modern treaty obligations 
with respect to submarine cables. 
Following these intermediary conventions, in 1982 the U.N. Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the contemporary convention for the law of the 
 
60  See id. arts. II, IV, VII; see also Douglas Burnett, Tara Davenport & Robert Beckman, Overview of the 
International Legal Regime, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 63, 71–72 
(Douglas R. Burnett, Robert C. Beckman & Tara M. Davenport eds., 2014). 
61  Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82. 
62  Id. art. II. 
63  Id. art. XXVI. 
64  Id.  
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sea, was created.65 UNCLOS was devised over extensive negotiations to replace 
the 1958 conventions with a more comprehensive framework of laws and 
obligations.66 Generally speaking, UNCLOS divides the seas into three sections, 
each corresponding to distinct rights and duties of states: territorial seas, the 
exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and continental shelves, and the high seas. 
UNCLOS incorporated many of the same rights and duties with respect to 
submarine cables as the 1884 Convention and the 1958 conventions. To 
understand the rights of states under UNCLOS, this Comment will review states’ 
rights with respect to submarine cables in each of these three territorial zones. 
A state’s territorial seas are the sea, including its bed and subsoil, for the area 
up to 12 miles from a state’s shores.67 States maintain sovereignty over the 
territorial sea and can impose their own laws over this area, including with respect 
to submarine cables.68 If foreign actors break the coastal state’s laws in its 
territorial waters, those actors would be subject to the coastal state’s jurisdiction 
under UNCLOS. If a foreign state hacked into or damaged the coastal state’s 
submarine cables within its territorial waters, those foreign hackers would be 
subject to the coastal state’s laws against submarine cable hacking or damage to 
submarine cables. For this reason, among others, states do not engage in hacking 
in other states’ territorial waters. Even if they did, however, most states have not 
crafted any protections or regulations on submarine cables within their territorial 
waters.69 Where states have crafted protections for intentional or negligent damage 
to cables, those protections are rarely enforced and are often quite weak.70 
In the second zone, coastal states can claim the EEZ and continental shelf 
up to 200 nautical miles past the borders of the state’s territorial seas.71 The 
delimiting of the precise boundaries of this zone is somewhat complicated 
however.72 Within this area, states enjoy certain rights to exploit natural resources 
or explore.73 Regardless of these rights, other states maintain general rights to 
 
65  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter 
referred to as UNCLOS]. 
66  UNCLOS, INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE, https://perma.cc/K8ZT-2UXV. For 
more information on the development of UNCLOS, see generally Myron H. Nordquist, et al., 
UNCLOS 1982 COMMENTARY (Myron H Nordquist et al. eds., 2012). 
67  UNCLOS, supra note 65, art. II. 
68  Id. art. XXI; Burnett et al., supra note 60, at 76. 
69  Robert Beckman, Protecting Submarine Cables from Intentional Damage, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 281, 287 (Douglas R. Burnett, Robert C. Beckman & Tara M. 
Davenport eds., 2014). 
70  Id at 287. 
71  UNCLOS, supra note 65, art. LVII. 
72  Id.. See generally Kenneth W. Swenson, A Stitch in Time: The Continental Shelf, Environmental Ethics, and 
Federalism, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 851 (1987). 
73  UNCLOS, supra note 65, art. LVI. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 274 Vol. 22 No. 1 
“other internationally lawful uses of the seas related to those freedoms” which can 
extend to submarine cables.74 UNCLOS also extends particular freedoms around 
submarine cables including the ability to lay submarine cables and pipelines.75 
While not explicitly mentioned, this freedom likely also includes the ability to 
operate, repair, and inspect previously laid submarine cables.76 
States, however, do not have unfettered access to the EEZ and the 
continental shelf in the name of cable installation or repair. UNCLOS requires 
states exercising these rights to “comply with the laws and regulations adopted by 
the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other 
rules of international law.”77 While this language is broad, this allowance permits 
coastal states to restrict foreign states’ activities in furtherance of their right to 
exploit natural resources in the EEZ or continental shelf or their right to explore 
the area. In practice, however, this allowance is largely curtailed, and states broadly 
enjoy States therefore broadly enjoy the freedom to lay submarine cables in the 
EEZ. 
UNCLOS provides similar protections for submarine cables in the EEZ as 
in territorial waters, though jurisdiction is less clear. Again, similar to territorial 
waters, while states are required to “adopt the laws and regulations necessary to 
provide that the breaking or injury by a ship flying its flag or by a person subject 
to its jurisdiction of a submarine cable beneath the high seas done willfully or 
through culpable negligence… be a punishable offense,”78 most states have not 
done so.79 Unlike territorial waters, however, coastal states’ regulations in the EEZ 
or the continental shelf do not apply to foreign nationals who intentionally break 
or damage cables.80 This means states in the EEZ and the continental shelf can 
only hold their own citizens that injure cables liable under their domestic laws. 
While some states have made novel legal arguments about submarine cables as 
being in a protected zone of exploitation,81 the majority of states accept domestic 
jurisdiction does not extend to cables in the EEZ.82 In the instance of hacking, 
this would mean coastal states could only address domestic hackers, which, while 
 
74  Id. art. LVIII. 
75  Id. art. LXXXVIII. 
76  See id. art. LXXIX (referring to the “laying or maintenance” of submarine cables and “repairing” 
existing cables.”); see also Burnett et al., supra note 60, at 81. 
77  UNCLOS, supra note 65, art. LVIII. 
78  Id. art. LXIII. 
79  Beckman, supra note 69, at 288. 
80  Id. 
81  Zone to Protect Perth Submarine Cables, AUSTRALIAN COMM’N & MEDIA AUTH., 
https://perma.cc/R6RS-Q6G3. 
82  Beckman, supra note 69, at 288. 
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potentially useful for private actors, does not likely apply to the majority of 
hacking incidents, which are largely committed by foreign governments. 
The high seas are the third zone described by UNCLOS. The high seas are 
defined as “all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic 
zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic 
waters of an archipelagic State.”83 The high seas are canonically regarded as 
beyond the reach of states’ national jurisdiction.84 Accordingly, the high seas are 
the largest sea area and do not offer any domestic protections against hacking 
attempts. 
The high seas, although beyond the reach of any state, are subject to 
applicable international treaties including UNCLOS. Broadly, the high seas are 
reserved for “peaceful purposes.”85 If hacking was considered an act of aggression, 
states would not enjoy that freedom on the high seas. Similarly, acts considered 
illegal under international treaties or conventions, like slave trading for example, 
would not be a permissible use of the high seas. Presently, as discussed in Section 
V, submarine cable hacking is considered a peaceful activity and not illegal under 
any international convention. 
UNCLOS does not offer many protections for submarine cables on the high 
seas. Under UNCLOS, states maintain the freedom to lay submarine cables86 but 
must exercise this freedom in recognition of other states’ exercise of high seas 
freedoms.87 Similar to requirements for the EEZ, states are obligated under 
UNCLOS to craft laws and regulations that require their citizens to compensate 
cable owners for damage they caused to cables or pipelines.88 Many states have 
not designed laws to meet this obligation and those that have generally involve 
paltry compensatory payments.89 Again, like the EEZ, these regulations would not 
extend to foreign nationals on the high seas under UNCLOS. 
Unlike the 1884 Convention, UNCLOS included a dispute resolution 
framework for conflicts between states. The International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea (ITLOS) serves as a binding dispute resolution mechanism where states 
are unable to reach a peaceful settlement. ITLOS has jurisdiction over “any 
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which is 
submitted to it in accordance with this Part” including failing to comply with 
 
83  UNCLOS, supra note 65, art. LXXXVI. 
84  Id. art. LXXXIX (“No state may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its 
sovereignty.”). 
85  Id. art. LXXXVIII.. 
86  Id. art. CXII.. 
87  Id. art. LXXXVII. 
88  UNCLOS, supra note 65, art. CXIII. 
89  Beckman, supra note 69, at 288; see also Wagner, supra note 52, at 135. 
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convention obligations.90 Where states have not implemented their treaty 
obligations, ITLOS can compel states to specifically perform or craft regulations 
under their UNCLOS requirements. 
States are able to select ITLOS for the settlement of disputes at any time 
through means of written declaration;91 however, states must fully exhaust 
domestic remedies before applying for resolution through ITLOS.92 Therefore, if 
a foreign state hacks into a state’s submarine cable in its territorial waters, the 
injured state must seek liability under its domestic laws first where available. 
ITLOS can apply the international law under UNCLOS or “other rules of 
international law not incompatible with this Convention.”93 This extends to other 
human rights treaties or accepted international conventions. Generally, ITLOS 
handles cases involving foreign sailors held without cause,94 but the Tribunal has 
exerted its jurisdiction over any number of maritime issues.95 As discussed in 
Section VII, ITLOS may be a useful vehicle for arbitrating disputes between states 
around submarine cable hacking and the international right to privacy. 
Because UNCLOS does not offer explicit protections for cables from 
hacking on the high seas, the puzzle then is how to create enforcement 
mechanisms and norms against hacking. Because domestic jurisdiction can only 
be asserted in territorial waters and most states do not have robust domestic laws, 
trying to enforce cable protections through national laws seems impractical. 
Indeed, as will be discussed, scholars have consistently decried the absence of 
domestic protections for submarine cables. In the following Section, this 
Comment will explore whether other conventions in international law, rather than 
solely the laws of the sea, protect against submarine cable hacking. This Comment 
then explores possible solutions to this problem of liability using ITLOS as a 
possible avenue for liability. 
 
90  UNCLOS, supra note 65, art. CCLXXXVII. See generally Tullio Treves, Human Rights and the Law of 
the Sea, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 1 (2010). 
91  UNCLOS, supra note 65, art. CCLXXXVII. 
92  Id. art. CCXCV. 
93  Id. art. CCLXXXVIII. 
94  List of Cases, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, https://perma.cc/ZW45-Y548. 
95  For example, ITLOS adjudicated the maritime boundary between Mauritius and Maldives in the 
Indian Ocean. See Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Mauritius 
and Maldives in the Indian Ocean (Mauritius v. Maldives), Case No. 28, Special Agreement and 
Notification of 24 September 2019. In another case, ITLOS provided an advisory opinion for the 
minimum access conditions and exploitation of fishery resources for the Sub-Regional Fisheries 
Commission. See Request for Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries 
Commission, Advisory Opinion, 2 April 2015, ITLOS Reports 2015, Case No. 21. 
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V.  INTERNATIONAL NORMS WITH RESPECT TO HACKING  
This Section describes the international conventions and framework with 
respect to cyber operations and hacking. Generally, hacking and cyber surveillance 
are regarded as peacetime activities and are not limited by any international treaties 
or conventions. The methods employed in pursuit of these goals, however, may 
be deemed problematic by various conventions. This Section explores the limits 
of hacking techniques and cyber surveillance and discusses how shifting norms 
around the right to privacy may change international consensus on the viability of 
some surveillance tactics. 
At present, there is no international framework for hacking offenses or cyber 
operations. While previous conventions like the Budapest Convention on 
Cybercrime96 tried to harmonize national laws with respect to cyber operations 
and provide for mutual assistance in investigating and prosecuting cyber 
operations,97 there is no international legal framework for cyber offenses or 
hacking.98 
In response to lacking a global framework, a group of preeminent 
international law scholars and practitioners created the Tallinn Manual99 to 
describe the legal norms and regulations around cyber operations and hacking.100 
The Tallinn Manual is not an international convention and is not binding. Rather, 
the document serves as an expression of opinion of various experts versed in these 
topics. Accordingly, it should be considered a reflection of the law at the time of 
writing and not a limiting or normative statement of the law. The Tallinn Manual 
is also limited in scope and incorporates public, but not private or domestic, 
international law.101 The document, however, can provide a general insight into 
how the international community views current restrictions on cyber operations 
on the high seas and whether hacking is indeed a “peaceful use” of international 
waters. 
A.  General Cyber Operations on the High Seas  
According to the Tallinn Manual, the primary basis for liability for cyber 
activities is territorial. Much like a state has jurisdiction over damage to cables in 
 
96  Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, E.T.S. No. 185. 
97  Amalie M. Weber, The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 425, 426–
30 (2003). 
98  Id. at 428–30. 
99  NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 2017) 
[hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL]. 
100  Id. at 2. 
101  Id. at 4. 
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its territorial seas, states have jurisdiction over cyber activities or hacking that 
occur within their territory or their territorial waters.102 The experts note tapping 
a state’s submarine cables in its territorial waters violated its sovereignty.103 States 
then have jurisdiction over hacking attempts within their territorial waters. 
Tapping or hacking activities outside of a state’s territorial waters do not 
offer the same legal recourse. Like cable damage under UNCLOS, the EEZ and 
the continental shelf is subject to a complicated legal framework for cyber 
operations jurisdiction. Generally, if cyber operations are carried out for “peaceful 
purposes” and maintain “due regard to that State’s rights and duties in the zone,” 
they are permitted in the EEZ.104 And so long as these operations do not violate 
“other international legal norms… governing the circumstances,” they do not 
constitute a violation of state sovereignty in the EEZ.105 Hacking therefore in the 
EEZ, when it does not violate other international legal norms, is permissible. 
On the high seas, states have even fewer rights or protections against 
hacking. Cable hacking attempts on the high seas do not constitute a violation of 
the hacked state’s sovereignty.106 Indeed, background intelligence gathering on the 
high seas during peacetime has long been considered legal without much debate 
in the international community.107 While hacking or tapping constitute more 
invasive techniques than radio or sonar surveillance, which have both been long 
accepted, most scholars believe there is no difference by conducting more “active” 
intelligence gathering via hacking.108 As in the EEZ, however, human rights 
violations that occur during cyber operations on the high seas are not permissible 
according to the Tallinn Manual. 
As typified by the above, norms around cyber operations have either not 
solidified or are highly permissive of cyber operations on the high seas. Because 
these norms are absent, there is insufficient state practice and public international 
 
102  Id. at 51. 
103  Id. at 257. 
104  Id. at 233 (“In particular, employing a submarine or unmanned underwater vehicle to tap in 
territorial or archipelagic waters is inconsistent with the navigational regime of innocent passage as 
submarines are required to transit on the surface.”) 
105  Id. at 257. 
106  See Oliver J. Lissitzyn & Charles H. Stockton, Electronic Reconnaissance From the High Seas and 
International Law, 22 NAVAL WAR COLL. REV. 26, 28 (1970). 
107  See, e.g., Roger D. Scott, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International Law, 46 A.F. L. REV. 
217, 219 (1999). See also Davenport, supra note 29, at 105. 
108  TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 99 at 257. But see Davenport, supra note 29, at 105 (“Whether 
UNCLOS can be used to address the mass surveillance carried out through the tapping of undersea 
cables is not entirely clear . . . Such surveillance does not fall within conventional perceptions of 
military activities/intelligence gathering at sea, which as mentioned above, is targeted, and aims at 
enhancing knowledge of the marine environment and/or the military capabilities of other State’s 
navies.”). 
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law to conclude cyber espionage is per se banned.109 Experts, however, agree that 
cyber operations or hacking may be carried out in a manner that is unlawful.110 
Accordingly, this Comment turns to the consequences of hacking and review 
whether or not these effects may constitute some form of illegal or prohibited 
activity under public international law. 
B.  Incidental Effects of Submarine Cable Hacking: Cable 
Damage 
One incidental effect of submarine cable hacking is damage to the submarine 
cables as a result of splicing into the cable or damaging the cable in the installation 
of surveillance devices. As noted above, UNCLOS mandates states craft laws to 
hold their citizens liable for intentional or negligent damage to submarine cables. 
These laws, however, are limited in jurisdiction to territorial waters. Experts 
notably have split as to whether the mere act of tapping cables that results in 
damage renders it a violation of public international law regardless of location.111 
The majority of experts agreed states engage in these activities at their own risk 
and can incur liability for incidental damage. Separately, a handful of experts 
argued that unforeseeable damage from tapping operations would not incur 
liability. These experts note there is no settled case law as to whether incidental 
damage from cyber operations would be deemed foreseeable or intentional.112 
This question of liability for damage is nonetheless important. By being able 
to hold foreign states liable for damage incurred as a result of hacking, states can 
shift the cost-benefit calculus of hacking attempts by requesting damages. While 
this may not wholly eliminate submarine cable hacking, potential liability for 
damage may reduce overall hacking activity levels. It typically costs millions of 
dollars to repair damage to the actual cable.113 The economic costs associated with 
a down cable are hard to estimate but the losses can be extraordinary. Somalia lost 
internet access for three weeks due to cable damage at a cost of $130 million.114 
Even without a total internet outage, increased bandwidth demand and slower 
data speed as a result of cable interference can wreak huge productivity losses. If 
a state was held liable for repair costs, or lost productivity, the possible costs 
 
109  TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 99, at 169. 
110  Id. at 170. 
111  Id. at 257. 
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113  For example, a cable fault in the Pacific in 2007 cost $8 million to repair the cable. Michael Matis, 
The Protection of Undersea Cables: A Global Security Threat, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE (2012), 
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114  The Economic Impact of Submarine Cable Outages Can Still be Enormous, SUBCABLE WORLD (Aug. 21, 
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associated with hacking would rise and overall hacking activity levels may fall in 
turn. 
C. Incidental  Effects of Submarine Cable Hacking: Violations 
of the International Right to Privacy  
A second incidental effect of submarine cable hacking is the violation of 
citizens’ privacy by harvesting electronic data. Because hacking operators cannot 
control what data they siphon off, hackers will inevitably intercept citizens’ private 
communications and data in their operations, unless the cable is a dedicated 
military cable. This violation of privacy is significant because, as the Tallinn 
Manual experts noted, cyber operations may not be conducted in an unlawful 
manner.115 While controversial, the international right to privacy would likely be 
violated by these operations. Accordingly, this Comment next reviews the 
international right to privacy, its implications for submarine hacking, and the 
debate around its scope. 
A number of conventions have enumerated an international right to 
privacy.116 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights introduced this principle 
in Article 12 that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence.”117 The International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) enumerated this right in Article 17 that “no one shall 
be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence.”118 At its core, this right protects a “private sphere” of 
autonomous liberty and development that cannot be intruded on without 
permission by state actors, individuals, or corporations.119 This right has been 
extended to include protection of personal communications and data.120 The 
scope of this right is clear for intelligence gathering or hacking within the territory 
of a state. Any arbitrary electronic interception that takes place within a nation’s 
borders or involves that nation’s citizens violates the international right to 
privacy.121 
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The scope of this right is less clear for intelligence gathering on foreign states 
or foreign nationals. The U.S. has presented the most limited interpretation of the 
right to privacy in this context. According to the U.S., the right only attaches to 
citizens within a state’s territory and subject to its jurisdiction.122 Therefore, 
foreigners and citizens located abroad do not enjoy the right to privacy for U.S. 
surveillance activities. In the context of U.S. submarine cable hacking, this implies 
only U.S. citizens enjoy the right to privacy, and they only enjoy this right for 
submarine cable hacking conducted in the U.S.’s territorial waters. The majority 
of states in the international community hold the right is broader. According to 
the majority opinion, states “respect and ensure the rights laid down in the 
Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even 
if not situated within the territory of the State Party.”123 While the precise contours 
of the ICCPR are still debated, a number of international bodies have coalesced 
around the principle that a state’s obligations are maintained for foreigners and 
citizens alike.124 Under this interpretation, citizens enjoy the right to privacy for 
submarine cable hacking regardless of where the hacking takes place or what state 
conducts the hacking. 
The debate around the scope of this right centers on whether a state 
exercises “effective control” over a person or territory in determining jurisdiction. 
As discussed earlier, the high seas are beyond the territorial reach of any particular 
state. Therefore, questions of “effective control” become more pressing as 
scholars consider whether a state exercises effective control over cyberspace 
through cables located on the high seas. This question is hotly debated. Some 
scholars have noted limiting effective control to solely physical territory may result 
in illogical results as it is not clear where cyber communications are physically 
located when conducted over the internet.125 Other scholars have argued a “virtual 
control,” where states are liable for those citizens whose communications it has 
control over, is more appropriate.126 In the context of submarine cables, this may 
be a more appropriate approach as it would ensure the equal treatment of 
individuals regardless of physical location, which matches the traversing and 
multi-state nature of submarine cables. 
An international right to privacy nevertheless remains controversial. Some 
scholars insist an application of a universal right to privacy may undermine 
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domestic protections against surveillance currently in place.127 These scholars 
argue a more universal definition may reduce the obligations afforded domestic 
citizens under current cyber privacy laws.128 Other scholars have argued the right 
to privacy is socially defined and therefore changes from context to context or 
society to society.129 Accordingly, the scope of the right at issue may not extend 
to protections against state surveillance for defense purposes depending on the 
social definition and context. 
Regardless of the ongoing debate, the recognition and scope of the right to 
privacy appears to be shifting, as discussed in Section III, toward a greater 
recognition of the right to privacy. Scholars have noted international human rights 
cases increasingly find states’ human rights obligations follow them in acting 
abroad.130 As this recognition expands, mass surveillance is increasingly 
considered “arbitrary” and in contravention of the ICCPR.131 In a 2015 
groundbreaking case, ten U.K. NGOs filed an action with the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) arguing the U.K.’s mass surveillance system violated the 
right to privacy.132 The ECtHR agreed noting the surveillance scheme’s arbitrary 
intelligence collection violated the right to privacy under the European 
Convention on Human Rights.133 This case is significant because it specifically 
addressed bulk surveillance conducted through fiber optic cables.134 On appeal, 
the ECtHR dismissed the case for failing to seek appropriate domestic remedies.135 
Nevertheless, the court’s initial ruling reflects a concerted shift in behavior toward 
greater privacy rights recognition. Similarly, in 2020, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) held indiscriminate government mass surveillance 
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violated E.U. regulations for privacy and data protection.136 The CJEU held 
surveillance should be conducted only for what is strictly necessary for national 
security purposes.137 These shifts are representative of general shifts in recognition 
of the right to privacy. 
While cooperation for developing protections and harmonization of 
definitions for privacy in the internet age is ongoing,138 it is apparent that the right 
to privacy exists and is increasingly recognized in international public law. While 
this Comment cannot cure all the debates around the right to privacy, the solution 
described in Section VII provides a novel exploration of the right to privacy in 
cyber space that may help advance discussions elsewhere. 
VI.  THE LAY OF THE LAND OF CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP  
This Section explores current scholarship on submarine cable protections 
and submarine cable hacking. This Section serves to provide context for the 
novelty of the solution offered in Section VII and discuss how scholars interpret 
currently proposed avenues for liability for submarine hacking. Scholars currently 
focus on protections for incidental or intentional damage to cables in order to 
raise the relative costs associated with hacking. Scholars, however, are pessimistic 
about current domestic protections toward submarine cables and generally accept 
submarine cable hacking as part of the international landscape. Notably, scholars 
have previously not used the right to privacy to frame the debate around 
submarine cable hacking and have not used dispute resolution mechanisms, like 
ITLOS, for resolving these issues. 
As a summary of prior Sections, UNCLOS does not explicitly place 
restrictions on peacetime intelligence gathering or cyber operations on the high 
seas or in the EEZ. Because the high seas are not subject to any state’s domestic 
jurisdiction and the EEZ is subject to very limited jurisdiction, domestic laws 
against hacking or damage to submarine cables do not apply in these areas. 
Further, there is no international treaty or convention that restricts or bans cyber 
operations generally. Experts agree that “the bottom line is that there is no clear 
prohibition against the physical tapping of fiber optic cables in the EEZ [or the 
high seas] to be found in UNCLOS”139 or other international treaties.140 
While states generally have the freedom to conduct cyber operations on the 
high seas, if the method of those operations violates other international treaties or 
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laws, those methods are subject to liability.141 Scholars have therefore turned to 
UNCLOS Article 112 and Article 113, which describe the freedom to lay 
submarine cables and the obligation of states to create domestic protections for 
cables, as possible protections for cables.142 In their analyses, these scholars focus 
on incidental damage to submarine cables, the first indirect effect from cable 
hacking. 
Scholars, however, are pessimistic about using Article 112 or Article 113 to 
protect submarine cables. While UNCLOS requires states to have domestic laws 
to punish intentional or negligent damage of undersea cables, most states have not 
imposed these regulations. For example, Canada does not have any legal 
protections for cables once laid.143 While Canadian law requires permits to lay 
cables and conduct periodic environmental impact reports, cable companies do 
not have any legal recourse under Canadian law for cables damaged by other 
parties. The U.N. General Assembly has even called on states to implement 
protections under Article 113 due to the paucity of available domestic protections 
against damage to cables.144 
And where states do have regulations, those protections are generally weak 
and rarely enforced. For example, U.S. federal law states parties who intentionally 
damage cables are subject to a maximum fine of $5,000.145 Repair costs far exceed 
this figure.146 Other states similarly have weak enforcement regimes. In Australia, 
the penalty for intentional damage of submarine cables is AUS$2,000 or 
imprisonment for 12 months while the penalty for negligent damage is AUS$1,000 
or imprisonment for 3 months.147 With such insignificant protections, there are 
few incentives for cable owners or regulators to seek enforcement. Accordingly, 
there are no documented instances of prosecution under either the U.S. or 
Australian laws. 
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Scholars and advocates have argued strengthening these domestic 
protections may offer some relief against hacking. As discussed in the previous 
Section, by increasing the costs associated with a hacking operation, the associated 
cost-benefit analysis shifts. Scholars have focused on increasing these protections 
in the absence of a new international framework against hacking. Tara Davenport 
noted Article 113 of UNCLOS would apply to damage done through cable 
tapping but that domestic protections against submarine cable damage are 
“woefully inadequate” and “not commensurate with the damage resulting from 
intentional interference.”148 Zoe Scanlon likewise recognized despite the 
“assumption underpinning UNCLOS that coastal states would recognize their 
clear interest in protecting submarine cables,” most states have not enacted 
legislation protecting cables.149 This contributes to an ineffective legal regime 
against cable damage and hacking. 
While there is some appetite for bolstering domestic protections,150 doing so 
is an incomplete solution. First, the associated penalties would have to be severe 
in order to change the calculus of hacking states and compensate the injured cable 
owners. High penalties, however, may result in expensive liability for negligent, 
non-hacking agents like ship owners who incidentally drop anchor on a cable—
the most common cable injury.151 High penalties may also incentivize states to 
cheat by refusing to pay damages or prosecute their citizens. Further, these 
domestic regulations could only assert jurisdiction over the citizens and ships of 
the regulating state or in offenses committed in its territorial waters. While hacking 
is easiest closest to land,152 the activities at issue most often do not occur in 
territorial waters and most commonly involve foreign actors or states as discussed 
in Section II. 
Scholars, in recognition of these weaknesses, have generally accepted 
submarine cable hacking as part of the international landscape until further 
protections can be crafted or norms around cyber operations crystallize against 
mass surveillance.153 Scholars, however, have overlooked the second indirect 
effect of cyber operations on submarine cables: privacy violations. The following 
section offers a novel solution to the problem of submarine cable hacking by 
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combining the dispute resolution framework under UNCLOS with other sources 
of public international law using privacy as grounds for liability. 
VII.  USING ITLOS  TO TRIGGER DISPUTE RESOLUTION :  
DAMAGE AND PRIVACY SOLUTIONS FOR HACKING  
This Section describes the novel solution offered by this Comment with 
respect to submarine cable hacking. The Section first describes how the binding 
dispute resolution system under the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS) likely has jurisdiction over submarine hacking attempts. This Section 
further argues, contrary to prior scholarly work, the lack of domestic protections 
for submarine cable hacking benefits the creation of international norms and a 
regime against cable hacking. This Section then proposes two solutions using 
ITLOS. First, ITLOS can be used to create an international regime protecting 
against submarine cable damage. This in turn raises the costs of submarine cable 
hacking and may lower hacking activity levels. Second, ITLOS can serve as a 
forum to argue hacking violates the international right to privacy and therefore 
should not be permitted even on the high seas. This analysis of the right to privacy 
with respect to submarine cables is novel in current scholarship and contributes 
to the ongoing debate about the limits of bulk surveillance collection and 
surveillance protections generally. 
A.  Jurisdiction Under ITLOS 
As a preliminary matter, ITLOS likely has jurisdiction over alleged 
submarine hacking disputes. As referenced above, under UNCLOS, ITLOS 
serves as a dispute resolution mechanism between states. The jurisdiction of 
ITLOS is broad, encompassing “all disputes and all applications submitted to it in 
accordance with [UNCLOS].”154 To confer jurisdiction, therefore, states must 
have a viable link between hacking attempts and UNCLOS. 
Under UNCLOS Articles 112 and 113, states have two arguments as to why 
ITLOS has jurisdiction over submarine cable hacking. First, states can use ITLOS 
for dispute resolution where other states are not abiding by their obligations to 
UNCLOS. Article 113 provides states must adopt laws and regulations to punish 
“breaking or injury” of submarine cables on the high seas “in such a manner as to 
be liable to interrupt or obstruct telegraphic or telephonic communications.”155 
States therefore must create domestic liability schemes to hold its citizens liable 
for damage to or interruption of submarine cables on the high seas. If, for 
example, a state has not met its UNCLOS Article 113 obligations to have domestic 
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regulations and a foreign state’s cable is damaged, the foreign state can invoke 
ITLOS to determine the breaching state’s cable liability. Generally, disputes 
between states about how to handle cable damage would sufficiently link to 
UNCLOS to confer jurisdiction.156 
Second, states can present arguments that protections for cables under 
UNCLOS are broader than the right to merely lay cables. Article 112 codifies the 
right for all states “to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the bed of the high 
seas beyond the continental shelf.”157 While not stated, it can be assumed states 
have the freedom to operate these cables on the high seas. If a foreign state were 
to violate this assumed right of operation, through hacking or cable signal 
disruption, an injured state may then have grounds for liability under UNCLOS. 
ITLOS would be a suitable body to address the violation of this right because the 
tribunal adjudicates the rights and responsibilities of states on the high seas. 
Even if Articles 112 and 113 are not compelling enough to justify 
jurisdiction, ITLOS also has jurisdiction over “any dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of an international agreement related to the purposes 
of [UNCLOS].”158 This broad language allows ITLOS to exert jurisdiction over 
any international treaty that affects or interacts with UNCLOS. While broad, 
ITLOS usually declines, however, jurisdiction absent some connection to the high 
seas or a subject matter of UNCLOS. Scholars have noted the specialized nature 
of ITLOS means the “subject matter of any agreement providing for jurisdiction 
of ITLOS would probably relate closely to the law of the sea, given the expertise 
of the judges of ITLOS.”159 
For example, in a case involving detained sailors, ITLOS asserted 
international human rights under other international conventions were at issue. 
Plaintiffs, however, had to first assert a jurisdictional link to these rights by noting 
that the detention that led to these violations was sanctioned under UNCLOS.160 
Similarly, Italy invoked the ICCPR in its complaint to ITLOS to free Italian sailors 
detained by the Indian government. Italy did not invoke a stand-alone argument 
for release under the ICCPR but rather paired it with UNCLOS provisions against 
“prejudice.”161 States can similarly invoke ITLOS to clarify the obligations of states 
to the international right to privacy, as articulated by a number of international 
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conventions, with respect to UNCLOS. States should then be able to obtain 
ITLOS jurisdiction under this more general human rights framework. 
Before reaching these questions of ITLOS jurisdiction, however, ITLOS 
may only resolve disputes under UNCLOS “after local remedies have been 
exhausted where this is required by international law.”162 Subsequently, states 
subject to hacking must have exhausted domestic remedies before looking to 
ITLOS. As mentioned above, scholars have frequently noted the paucity of 
domestic regulations against submarine cable hacking. Many states have not 
implemented any domestic regulations concerning submarine cable damage, let 
alone hacking.163 And where those domestic protections do exist, they are often 
weak relative to the potential damage done by hacking attempts to a cable’s 
constitution.164 Because domestic protections are not typically available or are 
insufficient where they are available, states have generally exhausted all domestic 
remedies.165 
And while scholars have criticized the weakness of these domestic 
protections and frequently recommended instituting stronger domestic 
regulations, the absence of these regulations actually strengthens the argument for 
jurisdiction under ITLOS. If domestic regulations were available, states would be 
obligated to pursue liability under those regulations. Because states have not 
implemented these regulations or have incredibly weak domestic protections, this 
domestic remedy is likely not available.166 Because states have therefore not 
complied with their requirements under UNCLOS, ITLOS has a strong case for 
jurisdiction as the appropriate body to handle disputes associated with these 
unfulfilled obligations. In this respect, the overwhelming weakness of domestic 
protections actually benefits states in arguing for jurisdiction before ITLOS. This 
observation is in contravention to scholars’ criticism of domestic cable 
protections.167 
Once jurisdiction has been established, states can then turn to the two 
indirect effects of hacking—cable damage and violations of the right to privacy— 
to seek liability against hacking states. 
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B.  Using ITLOS to Protect Against Cable Damage  
States can use ITLOS to protect against hacking by enforcing liability for 
damages incurred from hacking. Using Articles 112 and 113 of UNCLOS, injured 
states can argue the offending states are not abiding by their UNCLOS 
requirements to create a domestic regime to punish cable damagers. Injured states 
can further argue offending states violate the freedom to lay and operate 
submarine cables. In the first instance, an injured state may use ITLOS to force 
the offending state to punish its wrongdoers under its own domestic jurisdiction. 
ITLOS can bind states to craft and administer regimes protecting cables against 
damage by their citizens. This may in turn increase prospective economic costs of 
hacking and reduce overall hacking activity levels. While states may have an 
incentive to cheat, the political costs from breaking with its required enforcement 
regime will only increase under a binding dispute resolution order from ITLOS. 
States can further argue domestic protections as required under UNCLOS 
may not wholly protect this articulated right. If the cost of damage to cables is so 
expensive168 and the economic value of internet access is so great,169 states can 
argue the domestic regimes formulated and required under UNCLOS may not 
adequately protect their rights to be free from damage or interference. 
Accordingly, states may argue ITLOS should assert some damages or 
compensation requirement for intentional damage to cables from hacking. 
In the second instance, states may argue the freedom to lay and operate 
cables under UNCLOS extends to protections against interference by foreign 
states on the high seas. While UNCLOS only protects against “damage” to 
cables,170 states can reasonably argue the UNCLOS protections are an outgrowth 
of a history of protecting general use and operation of cables. Because the 1884 
Convention protected against interference of cable operation, which was 
subsequently codified in the intervening conventions, states can reasonably claim 
UNCLOS’s more general cable freedoms extend to freedom from arbitrary 
interference by foreign states. Because hacking interferes with a cable’s signal and 
likely requires repair by the operator, states can then argue hacking falls under this 
sphere of prohibited activities. 
ITLOS would likely be receptive to this argument. ITLOS has a history of 
extending greater protections to states than is precisely articulated in the language 
of UNCLOS. In MV/Saiga, ITLOS held Guinea violated the prohibition against 
the excessive use of force in detaining ships, although prohibitions against the 
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excessive use of force are not expressly articulated by UNCLOS.171 And in Guyana 
v. Suriname, ITLOS held Suriname used unlawful force against a Canadian vessel 
licensed by Guyana even without a prohibition on the use of force against foreign 
vessels under UNCLOS.172 These cases indicate ITLOS’s willingness to extend 
more general international law protections beyond UNCLOS. These cases further 
demonstrate ITLOS is willing to extend protections to states beyond the text of 
UNCLOS using the history and subtext of the treaty. Accordingly, ITLOS may 
be receptive to the argument that freedom from damage or interference has long 
been historically recognized. 
This solution is novel as it resolves the lack of enforcement mechanism 
scholars criticized by scholars with respect to domestic cable regimes. Because 
ITLOS can require states to abide by their treaty obligations, ITLOS can then 
mandate states create domestic regulations to protect cables. Further, this solution 
allows ITLOS to hear arguments about more general freedoms related to 
submarine cable use. Because ITLOS can hear arguments related to other binding 
treaties and agreements,173 states can argue the 1884 Convention or intervening 
law of the sea conventions established the freedom to lay and operate cables 
includes freedom from unnecessary cable interference. 
This solution carries with it a handful of potential caveats. First, ITLOS will 
most likely require the offending country to hold violators domestically liable. This 
follows because Articles 112 and 113 of UNCLOS only require a domestic cable 
protection scheme. The offending country is likely to impose minimal penalties 
or elect not to impose penalties. This strategy may then not raise costs associated 
with hacking to lower overall activity levels. This outcome, however, does not 
fully undermine the solution described above. If countries’ domestic regimes 
continue to be weak or weakly enforced, ITLOS is more likely to extend greater 
protections to cables than are required under UNCLOS. This would be similar to 
the extension of greater rights than necessary in Guyana v. Suriname.174 Further, 
continued refusal to hold violators domestically liable will cause ITLOS to hold 
contravening states accountable for failing to uphold their UNCLOS 
responsibilities. This may in turn increase the costs associated with hacking and 
lower activity levels. 
Second, arguments about more general rights to cable protections, such as 
the freedom of cable operation, may be weak because not many states signed onto 
the 1884 Convention or the intervening conventions of the laws of the sea. 
Without a convention to point to, ITLOS would then be relying on general norms 
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of international law in creating a liability regime for cable damage. ITLOS may be 
reticent to do that for fear of overstepping its bounds and of countries not 
participating in dispute resolution. Once such refusal occurred in Arctic Sunrise 
when Russia refused to appear in front of ITLOS.175 
Third, not all hacking attempts end in damage to submarine cables. If a cable 
was not damaged during a hacking attempt, this regime may not apply. 
Accordingly, states must turn to other norms or rights to protect against 
submarine hacking. The following Section presents a solution to submarine cable 
hacking that centers on the right to privacy and does not rely on damage to the 
underlying cable to provide liability. 
C. Using ITLOS to Protect Against Violat ions of the Right to 
Privacy 
States can also use ITLOS to pursue violations to the international right to 
privacy committed by hacking. ITLOS is able to apply UNCLOS law and “other 
rules of international law not incompatible with” UNCLOS including the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR.176 States subject to 
hacking can use these conventions and other international human rights to argue 
against hacking once they have jurisdiction under ITLOS. 
States can argue hacking contravenes the right to privacy embedded in 
numerous human rights treaties. As discussed in Section V, citizens enjoy a right 
to privacy under many international conventions. ITLOS can enforce violations 
of the ICCPR and other treaties as they relate to the right to privacy. While 
submarine cable hackers may be attempting to access sensitive government 
information, the hacking of undersea cables almost inevitably includes access to 
private citizens’ internet traffic because states cannot pick and choose what 
information they obtain.177 Such a broad sweeping may therefore be considered 
“arbitrary” and in contravention of the international right to privacy. 
While litigation around the right to privacy is relatively new, there is a trend 
among international bodies toward recognizing a universal right to privacy. As 
discussed in Section V, the ECtHR previously held the U.K.’s bulk surveillance 
program through fiber optic cables violated the right to privacy but subsequently 
dismissed the case on appeal for failure to pursue all domestic remedies.178 In 
October 2020, the CJEU held indiscriminate mass surveillance violated E.U. 
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privacy and data protections.179 And the German Constitutional Court held 
Germany’s constitutional protections against indiscriminate surveillance and data 
collection extended to foreigners living abroad.180 Beyond these court rulings, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed the rights under the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR apply globally.181 And while the ICJ 
has not affirmed a right to privacy against all indiscriminate surveillance, the Court 
did not denounce such an argument in two prior cases involving surveillance on 
private communications.182 This matches a trend in international bodies toward 
greater recognition of the right to privacy in recent years.183 
Rights under the ICCPR and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
have previously been protected by ITLOS. 184 While ITLOS has not taken on cases 
involving privacy, ITLOS precedent indicates a keen and demonstrated interest in 
protecting other human rights outside of those codified by UNCLOS. For 
example, ITLOS in its 1999 MV Saiga Nr. 2 judgment,185 for a case involving 
seized vessels, referred to “considerations of humanity” that “must apply to the 
Law of the Sea as they do in other areas of international law.”186 The ITLOS 
decisions in Arctic Sunrise and Enrica Lexie further indicate an increasing willingness 
by ITLOS to consider human rights concerns, either implicitly in the case of Enrica 
Lexie or explicitly as in Arctic Sunrise.187  
These cases demonstrate “a pattern of increased willingness on the part of 
States to invoke (universal) human rights instruments (i.e., the ICCPR)—and, in 
this case, even the views of human rights bodies (i.e., the Human Rights 
Committee) — in provisional measures proceedings before ITLOS.”188 Scholars 
have observed ITLOS increasingly incorporates “considerations of humanity” in 
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its decision-making.189 And, as discussed in Section V, the international right to 
privacy would fall into such considerations. 
ITLOS is further likely to invoke the right to privacy under the ICCPR or 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights because privacy is so closely linked to 
the subject of the proceeding on the merits. ITLOS requires “the relief sought 
(and the rights to be protected by the relief) must be closely related to the rights 
subject to the proceedings on the merits.”190 The freedom to lay cables under 
UNCLOS impugns some respect for those cables, their use, and their content. 
Because hacking violates the use and content of these cables, the right to privacy 
seems closely associated with hacking and capable of being invoked in 
proceedings. 
This solution is novel for a handful of reasons. First, this solution uses a 
supposed weakness in international protections for submarine cables—lack of 
domestic protections— as the jurisdictional hook for liability. Although scholars 
have critiqued the weakness of these regimes,191 the lack of an effective or a largely 
weak framework is actually a strength in creating a secondary method to pursue 
violators. Further, if domestic protections were stronger, ITLOS complaints may 
be superseded by domestic and local remedies. Because domestic remedies are 
limited in application and minimal at best, the dispute resolution system offered 
by ITLOS has broader application and ability to impose necessary penalties. 
Second, this solution avoids questions of the peacetime legitimacy of state 
intelligence gathering more generally. As discussed in the Tallinn Manual, cyber 
operations may not be conducted in an unlawful manner.192 If submarine cable 
hacking is considered a violation of the international right to privacy, this 
particular method of collecting surveillance would be deemed unlawful. States still 
preserve the ability to gather intelligence or surveillance through other, less 
arbitrary, means. This solution is therefore more tailored than other debates 
around peacetime intelligence gathering writ large. 
While a novel method of solution, the use of ITLOS to make claims against 
the international right to privacy is not without caveats. While the caveats 
discussed below are not fatal to the solution described, they do present questions 
about the potential scope of the solution asserted and how controversies around 
the international right to privacy and international legal obligations generally bleed 
into the conversation around submarine cables. 
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First, not all states are signatories to UNCLOS or the human rights 
conventions that describe the international right to privacy. Prominently, for 
example, the U.S. has not ratified its participation in UNCLOS, although it is a 
signatory.193 While making some claims against other states under UNCLOS, it is 
not clear the U.S. can invoke UNCLOS or be subject to liability under UNCLOS 
for claims made by other states.194 Non-signatory parties could voluntarily agree 
to arbitration under ITLOS but doing so does not seem to be in their rational self-
interest. Because not all states are then bound to ITLOS as a dispute resolution 
mechanism, the solution offered above may not be universal in application. 
Second, even if a decision is binding, it is not clear how ITLOS would 
enforce its arbitration decisions if parties do not comply.195 For example, in the 
Arctic Sunrise arbitration, Russia refused to appear before ITLOS or abide by the 
tribunal’s ruling.196 ITLOS does not have a security force to implement rulings and 
does not have the ability to levy sanctions or restrict access to seaways if states do 
not comply with their rulings. States would therefore still need to consent to 
whatever ruling ITLOS makes, even if their rulings are technically “binding.” This 
critique, however, could likely be levied with any international legal enforcement 
mechanism as truly bad actors can continue to evade judgments. 
Third, if the injured state and the hacking state have reasonably robust 
domestic cable protection schemes, ITLOS may not have jurisdiction. As 
discussed above, ITLOS requires states to exercise local remedies before 
appealing to ITLOS for dispute resolution. If the offending state has domestic 
protections, the injured state can appeal to that state to subject the offenders to 
domestic protections. This would result in the offending state being responsible 
for enforcing a regime which its citizens, and quite probably state agents, have 
violated. The incentives for the offending state to do so are minimal. 
This possibility, however, is not fatal to the above solution mechanism. 
States can still appeal to UNCLOS for greater clarity for states’ responsibilities for 
cable protections on the high seas under Articles 112 and 113 of UNCLOS. States 
can further dispute the domestic proceedings as insufficient to compensate the 
injured party for potential cable damage or the stolen information. And states can 
likely still make claims related to the international right to privacy not addressed 
by domestic protections. While this last claim may raise issues around whether 
ITLOS is the proper body to hear these complaints, because the conduct occurs 
at sea, ITLOS still has a viable claim to jurisdiction. 
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Fourth, relatedly, the most probable avenue to obtain jurisdiction under 
ITLOS involves damage to submarine cables as a result of hacking. If hacking 
technologies are sufficiently sophisticated, they may cause no harm to submarine 
cables. Accordingly, states would need to develop alternative reasons to obtain 
ITLOS jurisdiction. As discussed above, states can argue for dispute resolution 
for interfering with cable operation under Articles 112 or 113. More generally, 
states can argue ITLOS’s broad jurisdiction gives them standing, but this also 
seems weak. 
Alternatively, states can make claims using the more general wording of the 
1884 Convention. The 1884 Convention prevents “interference” with telegraph 
cables. Because hacking necessarily involves some degree of signal interference of 
fiber optic cables, hacking would likely fall into this broader “interference” 
category. And because the 1884 Convention does not have a body for dispute 
resolution related to obligations under the Convention, states can reasonably 
argue ITLOS is the most proper forum to hear disputes. 
This argument does not guarantee jurisdiction either. Foremost, the 1884 
Convention addresses telegraph cables. While it seems reasonable to extend these 
protections to fiber optic or internet cables given the spirit of the Convention, the 
1884 Convention is then limited in scope. Further, “interference” is harder to 
prove as compared to external damage to cables in hacking attempts. It is more 
difficult for signal operators to observe momentary gaps in service as compared 
to external cable damage, and maintaining a record showing this interference is 
both costly and difficult. Additionally, not many states are parties to the 1884 
Convention as compared to UNCLOS. While many of the power players likely to 
engage in hacking are parties to both, including Russia and the U.K., some states 
are parties only to UNCLOS, like China, or party only to the 1884 Convention, 
like the U.S. Finally, the 1884 Convention, like UNCLOS, only presents 
obligations for states to create domestic protective schemes for submarine cables. 
The 1884 Convention does not have any enforcement mechanisms against this 
bad behavior which makes ITLOS’s jurisdiction more specious. And claims 
related to U.N. human rights obligations using the 1884 Convention to confer 
jurisdiction seem weak. 
Fifth, claims of the right to privacy are relatively novel for international 
courts and the limits of this right have not been clearly defined. ITLOS, in turn, 
may not make sweeping decisions related to hacking for these types of cases 
without further clarity on the scope of the right to privacy. ITLOS may instead 
resolve the dispute by requiring greater compensatory damages or greater 
domestic protections for damage to cables without resolving the issue of hacking. 
This result may incidentally reduce hacking by raising the possible costs associated 
with hacking attempts, but states may still find the possible damages as reasonable 
to the perceived intelligence gains from hacking. Accordingly, privacy suits may 
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need to wait for greater international consensus on the limits of the right to 
privacy. 
This solution, however, can build on changing norms around the right to 
privacy. As discussed in Section V, the international right to privacy is increasingly 
recognized on the global stage. This solution presents novel questions within this 
ongoing debate. The recognition of the right to privacy depends largely on 
“effective control” of the persons or territory involved in the surveillance.197 
Submarine cables present novel questions around this effective control as it is 
nearly certain that at least some of a state’s citizens’ communications will be 
obtained through a submarine cable hack. Is this incidental acquisition enough to 
violate standards against countries surveilling their own citizens arbitrarily? 
Further, submarine cables are simultaneously a protected and necessary state 
resource and located on the high seas. Cables may then be a useful framing to 
consider how much control and sovereignty states have over their cyber space. 
Are cables more like physical territory or more like ephemeral cyber space in 
considering sovereignty and does the distinction ultimately matter with respect to 
privacy rights? This Comment is unable to answer these questions fully, but the 
Comment’s solution opens novel avenues for argument around these themes and 
may help advance the dialogue with respect to privacy rights. 
Sixth, some states may not want to pursue creating a regime against 
submarine cable hacking. As discussed in Section II, many global powers, 
including the U.S., China, the U.K., and Russia, engage in submarine cable 
hacking. States, particularly those with robust submarine military presences, may 
want to preserve the ability to surveil other states using submarine cable hacking. 
These states would therefore not invoke ITLOS or the right to privacy against 
submarine cable hacking. This may be a particularly onerous challenge because 
these powerful states often develop and enforce global norms. 
As discussed in Section III, however, this criticism may not necessarily be 
fatal to the solution offered above. Norms with respect to submarine cables and 
hacking in general appear to be shifting. Smaller states or landlocked states that 
do not engage in submarine cable hacking have incentives to further develop these 
norms to protect their citizens’ privacy and governmental data without the 
counterincentive of preserving the right to hack other states. While this shift may 
take time to play out, the momentum is in favor of increased recognition of 
privacy rights as discussed in Section V. Regardless, as hacking increases and as 
the associated damage from hacking rises, international legal solutions may be 
more cost effective than patrolling the seas against hacking attempts. Accordingly, 
states may decide international norms are a more cost-effective way of reducing 
hacking activity levels. 
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Seventh, if states elect not to pursue a hacking complaint against another 
state for geopolitical reasons, the injured cable operator may not be able to use 
ITLOS to seek a suitable remedy. In most cases, the injured party is likely a 
corporation. Due to the terrific costs in laying submarine cables, the majority of 
modern-day cables are owned and laid by private companies and collectives. For 
example, Google has backed at least 14 cables globally and other tech firms have 
similarly pursued their own submarine cable systems.198 Accordingly, corporations 
often foot the bill for cable damage or privacy concerns.199 
ITLOS jurisdiction over corporations is somewhat ambiguous but appears 
limited. Article 20 of the ITLOS charter provides non-state entities can access to 
the Tribunal for cases where other agreements accepted by all parties in the case 
confer jurisdiction to ITLOS.200 It is highly unlikely the corporation and the 
hacking party will have agreed to dispute resolution by ITLOS in the case of 
hacking. Accordingly, when the corporation’s home country elects not to pursue 
dispute resolution, ITLOS may not be a viable solution. 
This, however, does not entirely eliminate the possibility of enforcing an 
anti-hacking regime through corporate action. Depending on the jurisdictional 
limits of the corporation’s home country, corporations can pursue private civil 
suits against foreign states.201 These actions are generally not taken due to 
geopolitical concerns, concerns about comity, and questions about where the 
alleged tort occurred.202 The possibility of these suits, however, raises the specter 
of private action against hacking malfeasors, which may be worth considering in 
subsequent analyses beyond the scope of this Comment. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION  
This Comment examined whether states had any recourse under public 
international law when foreign states hacked into submarine cables. In so doing, 
this Comment explored public international law around submarine cables (Section 
IV) and public international law with respect to hacking (Section V) to conclude 
states can use the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) invoke 
liability (Section VI). This Comment argued ITLOS would have proper 
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jurisdiction over submarine hacking claims and would be a suitable body to 
address these complaints due to the weakness of domestic cable protections. This 
Comment argued states have two avenues for establishing liability through 
ITLOS: damage to cables or violations of the international right to privacy. This 
Comment thus invokes broader discussion of how states can seek legal recourse 
against submarine cable hacking while norms and conventions addressing hacking 
and submarine cables continue to develop. 
